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Abstract
This paper studies the connection between the stock market and the unem-
ployment rate. I establish three facts. First, the log of the real value of the
S&P 500 and the log of a logistic transformation of the unemployment rate
are non-stationary cointegrated series. Second, the stock market Granger
causes the unemployment rate. Third, the connection between changes in
the real value of the stock market and changes in the unemployment rate has
remained structurally stable over seventy years. My results establish that the
fall in the stock market in the autumn of 2008 provides a plausible causal
explanation for the magnitude of the Great Recession.
1 Introduction
In a recent paper in the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, (Farmer,
2012b), Roger Farmer pointed out that there are transformations of the U.S.
unemployment rate and the real value of the S&P 500 that are non-stationary
but cointegrated. Farmer provided a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
where changes in stock market wealth cause changes in the unemployment
rate. He estimated this model, using data on unemployment and the real
value of the S&P 500 from 1953q1 through 1979q3, and showed that the
model provides an excellent fit to data from 1979q4 through 2011q1.
Rosnick (2013) has argued that a univariate model provides a better pre-
diction of the unemployment rate than Farmer’s published model. I show
here, that although the univariate model provides more accurate out-of-
sample forecasts than the VECM, a bivariate model that includes information
from the stock market outperforms both alternatives. My results establish
that the stock market contains significant information that helps to predict
the future unemployment rate. A big stock market crash, in the absence of
central bank intervention, will be followed by a major recession one to four
quarters later. Further, the connection between changes in the stock market
and changes in the unemployment rate has remained structurally stable for
seventy years.
The exchange between Farmer and Rosnick raises two questions, both of
which I take up in this paper. The first question is philosophical. What does
it mean for one time series to cause another? I establish in Section 5 that the
stock market causes the unemployment rate in the sense of Granger (1969,
1980) and I discuss the implications of that finding for economic policy.
The second question is more narrowly defined. If the stock market Granger
causes the unemployment rate, how can a model that ignores stock market
information provide a more accurate forecast than one that exploits this in-
formation to inform its prediction? I answer that question in Section 6 where
I draw on the results of Clements and Hendry (1988, 1999) and Hendry (2004)
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who show that, in the presence of a structural break, a mispecified VECM
can provide misleading forecasts.
2 Related Literature
The correct way to model a pair of non-stationary cointegrated time se-
ries is with a VECM (Granger, 1981; Engle and Granger, 1987). Given the
causal link from the stock market to unemployment it should be possible
to predict the future history of the unemployment rate using its own past
and the past history of the stock market. But in the presence of structural
breaks, VECMs are not robust to shifts in the underlying equilibria. Models
that are overdiﬀerenced, and therefore mispecified, are known to outperform
well specified models that have undergone a structural break (Hendry, 2006;
Clements and Hendry, 1988, 1999; Castle, Fawcett, and Hendry, 2010). This
paper illustrates the result that overdiﬀerencing improves forecasting ability
in the context of the unemployment-stock market relationship, previously
studied in Farmer (2012b).
I am not the first to investigate the connection between wealth and sub-
sequent movements in economic activity. Lettau and Ludvigson (2004, 2011)
provide a statistical model of consumption, wealth and labor earnings as
non-stationary, but cointegrated time series, using the methods surveyed in
Hendry (2004) and Hendry and Juselius (2000, 2001). I look instead at the
relationship between the real value of the stock market and the unemploy-
ment rate.
The connection between the stock market and unemployment was recog-
nized by Phelps (1999) who pointed out that the stock market boom of
the 1990s was accompanied by a reduction in the unemployment rate and
Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps, and Zoega (2000), who found a similar correlation
between the stock market and unemployment for a variety of European coun-
tries. Following Phelps (1999) and Hoon and Phelps (1992), these authors
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explained this connection using Phelps’ (1994) structuralist model of the nat-
ural rate of unemployment. My explanation for persistent unemployment,
(Farmer, 2010a, 2012a,b, 2013a), is closer to the models of hysteresis de-
scribed by Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987) and Ball (1999) than the
structuralist model of Phelps. Nevertheless, the theoretical foundation for
persistent unemployment in Farmer (2010a, 2012a,b, 2013a) is very diﬀerent
from the one provided in their work.
3 Properties of the Data
The data I use in this analysis include the S&P 500 from Shiller (2014)
and the unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The stock
market data are quarterly averages of Shiller’s monthly series and the unem-
ployment rate is the quarterly average of the monthly rate. These data are
graphed in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Data Used in This Study
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I have deflated the S&P 500 by a measure of the money wage, constructed
by dividing compensation to employees from Table 1.12 of the National In-
come and Product Accounts by full time equivalent employees from Table 6.5
of the NIPA accounts, interpolated from the annual data. The series were
further transformed as follows
 = log
µ
S&P 500
Money Wage Series
¶

 = log
µ
100× unemployment rate
unemployment rate
¶

to map them each into the real line. This latter transformation is important
because I will argue that  and  defined in this way, are non-stationary
series that are unbounded above and below. All data are available on my
website and the technique of deflating by the money wage is discussed in
Farmer (2010a).
On Figure 1, the shaded grey areas are NBER recessions, the solid line is
the unemployment rate and the line with circles represents the stock market.
The unemployment rate is measured on the right axis on an inverted scale
and the stock market is measured on the left axis.
Table 1:  
test statistic p-value test statistic p-value
1953q1 — 1979q3 −165 045 −138 059
1979q4 — 2011q1 −200 029 −144 056
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test: Null is that  or  has a unit root
Table 1 reports augmented Dickey Fuller tests for the null hypothesis that
 or  have a unit root. Because there is strong evidence that many macro
time series behave diﬀerently before and after the Volcker disinflation, I have
split the sample in 19793, the date when Volcker came into oﬃce. Test
statistics for the subsample from 19531 through 19793 appear in the first
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row, and statistics for the subsample from 19794 through 20111, appear
in the second. In each case the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be
rejected at the 1% level and the smallest one-sided p-value is 29% These
results suggest that both time-series are integrated of order 1.
Table 2 presents results from two diﬀerent tests developed by Johansen
(1995) to test for cointegration between non-stationary series. The lag length
for each test, equal to 3, was chosen to satisfy the Aikake Information crite-
rion and the table presents p-values for the Johansen Trace Test and Maxi-
mum Eigenvalue Test over two diﬀerent sub-periods for the null hypotheses
of 0 cointegrating vectors and at most 1 cointegrating vector.
Table 2: 0 CI Vectors At most 1 CI Vector
Trace Test Max-EV Test Trace Test Max-EV Test
1953q1 — 1979q3 004 003 030 029
1979q4 — 2011q1 002 003 015 015
P-values for Johansen Tests: Null is 0 or at most 1 CI Vector
The first row of the table is for the first subsample and the second row is
for the second. In all cases the null of no cointegrating vectors has a p-value
of less than 5%. In contrast, the null of at most one cointegrating vector has
p-value of 30% in the first subsample and 15% in the second. These results
provide support for modeling the bivariate properties of unemployment and
the stock market as a VECM with a single cointegrating vector.
4 Granger Causality Tests
I have established that unemployment and the stock market are cointegrated.
Farmer (2012b) claimed that the stock market causes the unemployment rate.
To check the viability of that claim, Table 3 presents Granger causality tests
for each of the two sub-periods. In each case, these tests were carried out
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using the correction for non-stationary time series developed by Toda and
Yamamoto (1995), and implemented in Eviews with the method suggested
by Giles (2011).
Table 3: Granger Causality Tests
Subsample: 1953q1-1979q3
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
Excluded Chi-sq df p-val Excluded Chi-sq df p-val
 1446 3 000  904 3 011
Subsample: 1979q4-2011q1
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
Excluded Chi-sq df p-val Excluded Chi-sq df p-val
 2264 3 000  669 3 074
For both subperiods, the hypothesis that the stock market does not
Granger cause unemployment has a p-value of 0. In words, there is over-
whelming evidence that information contained in the stock market helps to
forecast the unemployment rate one quarter later. In contrast, the hypothesis
that unemployment does not help to predict the stock market has a p-value
of 11% in the first subsample and 74% in the second.
I have established that the stock market Granger causes the unemploy-
ment rate conditional on an information set that contains lagged values of
these two series. Perhaps, however, the stock market is reacting to some
other set of information that forecasts a recession. To check for that possi-
bility, I ran Granger causality tests on expanded data sets that included real
gdp, real investment spending, the three month treasury bill rate, the CPI
inflation rate and the spread of BAA bonds over ten year treasuries. With
the exception of the BAA spread, none of these variables altered the con-
clusion that the stock market Granger causes the unemployment rate. The
result of adding the BAA spread to the mix is reported in Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 4: Granger Causality Tests — Subsample: 1953q1-1979q3
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
Excluded Chi-sq df p-val Excluded Chi-sq df p-val
 1731 3 000  1107 3 001
 295 3 040  650 3 009
 3821 6 000  2196 6 000
Dependent Variable: 
Excluded Chi-sq df p-val
 136 3 071
 1635 3 000
 1909 6 000
Table 4 presents the results of Granger causality tests for a three variable
autoregression including the stock market, the unemployment rate and the
BAA spread, , for the period 19531 to 19793.
Table 5: Granger Causality Tests — Subsample: 1979q4-12011q1
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
Excluded Chi-sq df p-val Excluded Chi-sq df p-val
 3397 3 000  3147 3 000
 2675 3 000  155 3 067
 8335 6 000  3338 6 000
Dependent Variable: 
Excluded Chi-sq df p-val
 217 3 054
 119 3 075
 404 6 067
Table 5 presents Granger causality tests for the second subperiod from
19794 through 20111. For each table the top left panel reports causality
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tests for the unemployment rate, the top right is for the stock market and
the bottom left, for the BAA spread.
Table 4 shows that, when the BAA spread is added to the information set
in the first subperiod, the explanatory power of the stock market disappears
and its role is taken by the BAA spread. However, the spread itself is Granger
caused by the stock market.
Table 5 shows that, in the second subperiod, the individual probabili-
ties that either the stock market or the spread do not Granger cause the
unemployment rate are both zero. In both subperiods, the p-value for the
joint hypothesis that neither the spread nor the stock market Granger causes
the unemployment rate is zero. In other words; there is overwhelming ev-
idence that there is information in the financial markets that helps predict
recessions.
5 Causality and Control: Animal Spirits or
Fundamentals?
The fact that information from the financial markets Granger causes the
unemployment rate does not necessarily imply that, if we could control the
asset markets by government intervention, we would be able to control the
unemployment rate. That point is made clearly by Granger (1980) who
distinguished between causation and control. To make the case for control,
one needs an economic model that suggests a plausible mechanism to explain
the causal chain.
Consider, for example, the following two explanations for the deep reces-
sion that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008.
In the first explanation, market participants received a signal in the au-
tumn of 2008, that a fundamental event was about to occur that would
depress the value of stock market earnings and increase the value of un-
employment for an extended period of time. That news also increased the
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likelihood of corporate bankruptcies and increased the cost of credit for low
quality corporate borrowers. An example of such an event would be a court
ruling that increased union bargaining power and was perceived to lead to
significant future labor market disruptions and loss of output. I will call this
the fundamental view of the market.
In the second explanation, there was an increase in the perceived risk
of running a business. Although nothing fundamental had changed in the
economy, market participants anticipated that a recession was on the horizon.
This fear spread to the stock market and participants sold shares because
they believed that future markets prices would be lower. As a consequence
of the perceived increased risk in the financial markets, the face value of
paper assets dropped and households curtailed their spending causing firms
to layoﬀ workers. The reduced level of economic activity resulted in a self-
fulfilling drop in the value of earnings per share. I will call this the animal
spirits view of the market.1
According to the fundamental view of the market, an attempt to restore
confidence by treasury or central bank intervention will be self-defeating. If
government buys shares or low quality corporate bonds, paid for by borrow-
ing, they will lose money in the long-run because asset market intervention
cannot eﬀectively counteract the fundamental cause of the market crash. Ac-
cording to the animal spirits view of the market, restoration of confidence
through asset market purchases is an eﬀective way to prevent a market crash
from causing a recession.2 These two views cannot be distinguished ex ante
although they clearly have diﬀerent policy implications.
1I use the case of a court ruling as the fundamental event that triggers a crisis purely as
an illustration. In the context of the 2008 crisis it is diﬃcult to find a plausible candidate
for a fundamental event of any kind, and, for that reason, I personally find the animal
spirits explanation more plausible.
2The case for central bank intervention in the asset markets is made in Farmer (2010b,
2013b, 2014).
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6 Forecasting with Structural Breaks
In this section, I turn my attention to Rosnick’s finding that a univariate
ARMA process is a better predictor of the future unemployment rate than a
regression that includes lagged values of the stock market. To establish my
claim that the stock market does help to predict the unemployment rate, I
estimated three diﬀerent models on data from 1953q1 through 1979q3, and I
compared their forecast performance for the sample period 1979q4 through
2011q1. Model 1 is the VECM reported in Farmer (2012b), Model 2 is
a univariate model for the unemployment rate and Model 3 is a bivariate
vector autoregression. Models 2 and 3 were estimated in first diﬀerences.
Model 1 was estimated in first diﬀerences but includes a cointegrating vector
with lagged level information.3
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Parameter estimates for the VECM the univariate and bivariate models
are reported above as equations (1), (2) and (3).4 The coeﬃcients on levels
3All three models were estimated in Eviews.The data set and the Matlab code used
to construct Figures 2 through 7 are available on my website. Parameter estimates for
model 2 use robust regression (Huber, 1973) to correct for outliers. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
4The estimates reported in Farmer (2012b, page 698) contain a sign error. The coeﬃ-
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in the cointegrating equation are broken down into the loading factors, 
(a 2 × 1 vector), and the cointegrating equation,  , (a 1 × 3 vector). The
symbol  stands for the constant. In all cases  is the logarithm of a logistic
transformation of the unemployment rate and  is the logarithm of the S&P
500, measured in wage units.
7 The Three Models Compared
In Figure 2, I report smoothed histograms of the 1-step ahead forecast er-
rors of the unemployment rate for the period 1979q4 — 2011q1. The left
panel compares the VECM with the univariate model;5 the right panel com-
pares the bivariate and univariate models. On both panels the solid line is a
smoothed histogram of prediction errors from the univariate model and the
line with circles is the smoothed histogram for the comparison model.
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Figure 2: 1-step ahead forecast errors for the three models
cient on the lagged value of the stock market in the cointegrating equation should be +06
as reported here and not −06 as reported in the published paper. I omit estimates of the
constants in Models 2 and 3 since they are insignificantly diﬀerent from zero.
5This reproduces Figure 3 from Rosnick (2013).
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These panels show that the univariate model outperforms the VECM,
but the bivariate model is better than both. Further, the distribution of uni-
variate errors has a positive mean, indicating bias in the prediction, whereas
that of the bivariate model is centered on zero, indicating that it provides
unbiased estimates of unemployment out of sample. This result holds, not
only for 1-step ahead forecast errors, but also at longer forecast horizons.
Figure 3 plots the ratio of the mean squared forecast error of the com-
parison model to that of the univariate model, plotted as a function of the
forecast horizon, for forecast horizons up to three years (12 quarters).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
The MSE ratio against the forecast horizon
VECM vs Univariate
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
The MSE ratio against the forecast horizon
Bivariate vs Univariate
Figure 3: MSE prediction errors at diﬀerent forecast horizons
The left panel shows that this ratio is greater than 1 at all horizons,
indicating that the univariate model beats the VECM. The right panel shows
that this result is reversed for the bivariate model which has a MSE ratio less
than 1 at all horizons. These results show that the stock market contains
significant information that helps to predict the unemployment rate at all
horizons up to and including 12 quarters.
The critical observer might think that the diﬀerence between the errors
from the bivariate and univariate models are small; after all, an error that
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is 80% of the univariate model may not be important. The following section
shows that this is not the case.
8 Forecasting the Great Recession
Figure 4 shows that between 2007q2 and 2009q1 the S&P 500, measured in
wage units, lost 50% of its real value falling from a high of approximately
24,000 to a low of roughly 12,000. At the same time, the unemployment rate
climbed from 4.5% to 10%. But could we have used the information that the
stock market crashed to help forecast the Great Recession?
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Figure 4: Unemployment and the Stock Market
Figures 5 through 7 compare univariate and bivariate dynamic predictions
for the unemployment rate at three diﬀerent forecast dates. In each panel,
the actual path of the unemployment rate appears as a solid line. The line
with circles is the forecast from the univariate model and the line with crosses
is the forecast from the comparison model. In the left panel, the comparison
model is the VECM; in the right panel it is the bivariate model. These
three figures show that the bivariate model outperforms the other two, and
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together, they imply that the stock market has considerable predictive power
if our goal is to predict the unemployment rate one to twelve quarters ahead.6
Figure 5 shows the dynamic forecasts that would be made by an econo-
mist, standing in the fourth quarter of 2007, using VECM, univariate and
bivariate models estimated on data from 1953q1 to 1979q4.
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Figure 5: Forecasts from 3 Models in the Autumn of 2007
The left panel of this figure shows that the VECM does a poor job and
it is apparent from this graph, that the VECM is seriously mispecified. It
predicts a large drop in the unemployment rate in 2008 in contrast to the
path of unemployment that actually occurred. The right panel of Figure
5 compares the univariate model with the bivariate VAR estimated in first
diﬀerences. This figure shows that adding the first diﬀerence of the stock
market to a prediction made in the fourth quarter of 2007 makes little or no
diﬀerence to the univariate forecast. That is unsurprising since, at this date,
the stock market had not yet begun its spectacular decline.7
6The left panel contains some of the same information as Figure 4 in Rosnick (2013).
7There was a substantial drop in housing wealth, beginning in the fall of 2006. In my
view, that drop triggered a subsequent increase in the unemployment rate. But it was
the precipitous crash in the stock market, beginning in the fall of 2008, that turned an
otherwise mild contraction into what we now refer to as the Great Recession.
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The failure of the VECM as a forecasting device is what one would expect
if there had a been a shift in the cointegrating relationship between the stock
market and the unemployment rate. Castle, Fawcett, and Hendry (2010)
suggest a number of responses to the problem of shifts in a cointegrating
equation including updating, intercept corrections and diﬀerencing. Taking
first diﬀerences of the VECM leads to a bivariate VAR in unemployment and
the stock market that ignores the estimated cointegrating equation. As I will
show below, the bivariate model has significantly better forecasting ability
than either the mispecified VECM or the univariate VAR for forecasting
periods that include information from the stock market crash in the autumn
of 2008.
Figure 6 shows a dynamic forecast made in the fourth quarter of 2008.
At this point, Lehman brothers had declared bankruptcy and, as is evident
from Figure 4, there had been a large drop in the S&P 500.
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Figure 6: Forecasts from 3 Models in the Autumn of 2008
The left panel of this figure shows that the VECM outperforms the uni-
variate model for two quarters, but that improvement does not last long. By
the third quarter, the mispecified cointegrating equation kicks in and tries
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to pull the relationship between unemployment and the stock market back
to its pre 1980 level.
The right panel of Figure 6 shows that the bivariate model correctly pre-
dicts the magnitude of the Great Recession four quarters ahead, but over-
shoots in the fifth quarter and beyond. In contrast, the univariate model
misses the depth of the increase in the unemployment rate by two full per-
centage points.
Figure 7 shows the dynamic forecast of the future unemployment rate us-
ing information up to and including 2009q4. At this point, the stock market
had recovered quite a bit of lost ground. As a consequence, the bivariate
forecast, plotted in the right panel, correctly predicts an improvement in the
labor market. In contrast, the univariate model predicts that the unemploy-
ment situation will continue to deteriorate. The left panel of Figure 7 shows
that, once again, the VECM performs poorly as a forecasting tool.
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Figure 7: Forecasts from 3 Models in the Autumn of 2009
To understand why the VECM performs poorly, Table 6 presents esti-
mates of the cointegrating vector for the two subsamples.
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First Sub-sample
19531− 19793   
coeﬃcient 1 06 −74
standard error 025 23
t-statistic (247) (−321)
Second Sub-sample
19794− 20111   
coeﬃcient 1 036 −53
standard error 009 087
t-statistic (386) (−606)
Table 6: Estimates of the Cointegrating Vector
This table shows that there was a structural break in the cointegrating
vector between the first and second subsamples. The coeﬃcient on the stock
market is estimated to be 06 in the first subsample and 036 in the sec-
ond. Similarly, the constant in the cointegrating vector moves from −74
to −053. Although these estimates are within two standard error bounds
of each other, the poor out-of-sample fit suggests that the diﬀerences are
statistically important.
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Figure 8: The Cointegrating Vectors
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Figure 8 plots the cointegrating vector estimated over the period from
1953q1—1979q3 as the solid line. The line with circles is the cointegrating
vector estimated over the subsample from 1979q4 through 2011q1. This
second cointegrating vector tracks the first until 1985q1. After that period it
begins to diverge and this divergence appears to be growing over time. It is
this divergence that is the cause of the failure of VECM to generate accurate
forecasts.
Failing to account for a break in the cointegrating vector causes the
VECM, as opposed to the bivariate diﬀerenced model, to perform badly as
a forecasting tool. But that does not allow us to infer that the stock market
can be ignored. As shown in Figures 5 through 7, changes in the stock mar-
ket have a large and statistically significant impact on changes in the future
unemployment rate.
9 Simulating the Great Recession
Where does this leave the claim that the stock market crash of 2008 caused
the Great Recession? Figure 9 presents the result of simulating the eﬀect
of a one quarter shock of 30% to the S&P. Thereafter, the log of the S&P
follows a first order AR model in diﬀerences with a coeﬃcient of 0.36. The
log of the unemployment rate follows a bivariate VAR with a coeﬃcient of
0.6 on the lagged log diﬀerence of unemployment and a coeﬃcient of -0.3 on
the lagged log diﬀerence of the stock market.8 I assume that there are no
further shocks after the first quarter drop in the value of the S&P.
In my simulation, a once and for all one quarter shock of 30% to the value
of the stock market causes the market to fall further over time, from 24,000
to 12,000. This drop mimics the realized fall in the U.S. data and it generates
8This version of the bivariate model uses the log of unemployment, instead of the log of
the logistic transformation. The model performance is comparable with that which uses a
logistic transformation for the unemployment rate. Because the coeﬃcients are elasticities,
they are easier to interpret.
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an increase in the unemployment rate from 4.5% to 18%, a number that is
closer in magnitude to the Great Depression than the 10% peak that actually
occurred. One might be concerned that the model predicts a larger increase in
the unemployment rate than we observed. However, the simulation depicted
in Figure 8 ignores the impact of subsequent shocks to the stock market. In
the data, these shocks were large and unprecedented.
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Figure 9: Simulating a Stock Market Crash
In November of 2008 the Federal Reserve more than doubled the mon-
etary base from eight hundred billion dollars in October to more than two
trillion dollars in December: And over the course of 2009 the Fed purchased
eight hundred billion dollars worth of mortgage backed securities.9 According
to the animal spirits explanation of the recession (Farmer, 2010a, 2012a,b,
2013a), these Federal Reserve interventions in the asset markets were a sig-
nificant factor in engineering the stock market recovery.
The animal spirits theory provides a causal chain that connects move-
ments in the stock market with subsequent changes in the unemployment
rate. If this theory is correct, the path of unemployment depicted in Fig-
ure 8 is an accurate forecast of what would have occurred in the absence of
9See Farmer (2013b, Chart 6) for a graph that illustrates the coincidence in timing
of the recovery in the stock market with the purchase by the Fed of mortgage backed
securities.
19
Federal Reserve intervention. These results support the claim, in the title of
this paper, that the stock market crash of 2008 really did cause the Great
Recession.
10 Conclusion
What should the policy maker take away from the three simulations presented
in this paper? First, the data on unemployment and the stock market are
non-stationary but cointegrated. Second, although the coeﬃcients on the
lagged first diﬀerences of unemployment and the stock market are remarkably
stable over seventy years, there have been important structural breaks in the
cointegrating relationship. Third, although the existence of structural breaks
means that a VECM does a poor job of forecasting the future unemployment
rate, a bivariate model using diﬀerenced data, can be relied upon as an
accurate forecasting tool.
What should we take away from the existence of structural breaks in the
cointegrating equation? In my view, it would be unwise to infer that low fre-
quency movements of the stock market do not matter for the real economy.
The failure of the VECM model as a forecasting tool does not imply that
we should ignore the cointegrating relationship between unemployment and
the stock market when formulating economic policy. When there are occa-
sional breaks in cointegrating equations, models specified in first diﬀerences
are known to generate more accurate forecasts, even if the data generating
process is a VECM (Hendry, 2006; Clements and Hendry, 1988, 1999).
It would be a mistake to assume, that because the cointegrating relation-
ship has shifted since 1979, that long-run movements in the stock market do
not matter for the long-run level of the unemployment rate. A safer inference
would be that the models we use to inform policy decisions are not always the
same ones we should use to make short-term predictions. As I have argued
elsewhere (Farmer, 2010a, 2012a, 2013a), the stock market matters for the
20
unemployment rate: and it matters a lot.
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